But why? What did I actually see here?

I’ve got five reasons for this trade, though I’ll be straight with you: the debt load risk hasn’t gone anywhere. Not yet.

In this article I will present two reasons. In the next one I will present the remaining three.

Table of Contents

1. Petrobras naphtha as a leading indicator

   1. The COVID playbook: tracking upstream data before the market does

   2. Naphtha decoded: what the feedstock actually tells you

   3. The correlation test: does naphtha predict Braskem volumes?

   4. What 88,000 barrels per day actually means

2. Braskem Idesa: from problem to catalyst

   1. Q4 utilization hits an all-time high

   2. Why the Chapter 11 panic is overblown

   3. The spread recovery the market is ignoring

   4. Tracking the ships: what vessel data reveals about Q1 demand

3. Takeaway

1. Petrobras naphtha as a leading indicator

The COVID playbook: tracking upstream data before the market does

Let me give you some context here.

When COVID-19 hit, most investors were in full panic mode. U.S. and Chinese economic growth had stalled, global shipping had cratered. To me, the play was obvious: diagnostic companies. Names like OPKO and LabCorp, market leaders with the capacity to run millions of PCR and antigen tests.

To track how strong the quarters would actually be, I was monitoring completed tests closely. That data was publicly available, state by state, city by city.

You could also get a clean read on OPKO's revenue trajectory just by watching confirmed COVID case counts.

More infections meant more urgency to test, which meant bigger government budgets flowing into diagnostics. Pretty simple logic, but most people weren't paying attention to it.

Naphtha decoded: what the feedstock actually tells you

So, back to Braskem and Petrobras.

How do you actually figure out whether polymer production is growing, along with cumene, benzene, ethylene or butadiene output?

You open Petrobras’s Production and Sales Report. Specifically, you look at domestic naphtha sales in the Brazilian market.

Yes, Naphtha is the core feedstock here, but unlike ethane, it produces a wide spectrum of products with very different economics.

Braskem runs naphtha through steam cracking at 800–900°C, where long hydrocarbon chains break via a radical mechanism into a mix of lighter components: ethylene, propylene, a C4 fraction including butadiene, and heavier byproducts.

Now that we’ve established the connection between naphtha and its chemical derivatives, let’s talk about Braskem’s role here.

Braskem is Petrobras’s largest naphtha customer, which means I can say with reasonable confidence that higher naphtha sales volumes from Petrobras signal stronger demand from Braskem. I’ll verify that assumption further down.

So here’s what caught my attention.

Petrobras was selling 88,000 barrels per day of naphtha, which as you can see in the chart below is the highest volume since the pre-COVID period, when Braskem was generating billions of dollars in quarterly EBITDA. That number is up 41.9% year over year and 63% quarter over quarter.

From there, I went back to stress-test my original assumption: higher naphtha volumes equal higher polymer and “Main Chemicals” production at Braskem.

The correlation test: does naphtha predict Braskem volumes?

A quick clarification here. Most investors think of Braskem purely as South America’s dominant polyethylene, polypropylene and polyvinyl producer. That’s not the full picture. Braskem is also a leading player in the synthesis of the chemical compounds I walked through earlier.

So, in Q4 Braskem sold 647 kton of Main Chemicals [produced in Brazil / South America, sold in the Brazilian market and for export].

For context, Braskem calculates the price per ton of “Main Chemicals” using the following blend:

Ethylene at 20%, Benzene at 20%, Gasoline at 25%, Butadiene at 10%, Propylene at 10%, Cumene at 5%, Paraxylene at 5% and Toluene at 5%.

For example, the price of benzene rose from $855 per ton on February 2 to $1,265 at the end of April in Europe.

Now I want to see whether there is at least a rough correlation between Braskem’s Main Chemicals volumes and Petrobras naphtha sales.

Looking purely at Main Chemicals versus naphtha, the correlation only shows up during large moves. Specifically, when quarterly naphtha sales shift by around 8 thousand barrels per day, Main Chemicals volumes tend to move by roughly 50 kilotons in the same direction.

The relationship might be cleaner if we compare Petrobras naphtha sales against Braskem’s resin volumes instead.

When naphtha growth hits the strong threshold of 8 thousand barrels per day or more, there were 4 such quarters over the period analyzed. In 3 out of 4 cases, or 75%, resin sales also posted strong growth of 50 kilotons or more: Q2 to Q3 2021 at plus 135 kilotons, Q2 to Q3 2023 at plus 190 kilotons, and Q1 to Q2 2025 at plus 58 kilotons.

The one exception was the Q4 2021 to Q1 2022 transition, where naphtha rose 8 thousand barrels per day but resins actually declined 25 kilotons.

So strong naphtha growth is accompanied by comparable resin volume growth in the majority of cases, which points to a moderate positive relationship between the two when moves are large enough to matter.

What 88,000 barrels per day actually means

So what does 88,000 barrels per day actually tell us?

At minimum, it tells us that polymer volumes in the coming quarter are likely to come in strong relative to the 2024–2025 baseline. That’s not a bold prediction, it’s just reading the data.

When Braskem’s largest feedstock supplier is moving naphtha at the highest rate since the pre-COVID boom, you don’t need a complicated model to understand what happens downstream.

75% hit rate on a leading indicator is something most analysts would take seriously, especially when the magnitude of the move, 41.9% year over year, 63% quarter over quarter, is this large.

I'm not guaranteeing a record quarter. But with naphtha running at these levels, I'd be genuinely surprised if resin volumes don't come in strong. The data is pointing in one direction.

Most people will wait for Braskem’s quarterly release to confirm it. By then, the move has already happened.

2. Braskem Idesa: from problem to catalyst

Q4 utilization hits an all-time high

Let me start with the Q4 report.

The average utilization rate of Braskem Idesa’s polyethylene facilities hit what I estimate to be an all-time high of 92%, driven by increased ethane imports through Terminal Química Puerto México.

The result: polyethylene sales volume came in at 221 kton in Q4, up 51.4% quarter over quarter and 13.3% year over year.

Given the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the resulting sharp drop in polyethylene exports from Asia to Mexico, I expect Braskem Idesa to sell around 225 thousand tons in Q1 2026.

Why the Chapter 11 panic is overblown

Now, as you may recall, in early February rumors surfaced that Braskem Idesa would file for Chapter 11 due to insufficient cash to cover coupon payments on bonds maturing in 2029 and 2032. Then the Israel/U.S. war with Iran changed everything. The risk tied to their total debt of $2.6 billion as of end of 2025 hasn’t gone away.

But I think the retail panic around a potential filing is overblown. Take “Braskem Idesa S.A.P.I. 7.45% 19/29” as an example: that bond has moved from 53 to around 70 as of May 4th.

In my experience studying the 2008 crisis, secured senior bonds were trading in the 50 to 60 range right before companies actually filed for Chapter 11.

There’s more.

On April 28th, ICIS reported that Petrobras CEO Magda Chambriard flew to Mexico to meet with President Claudia Sheinbaum and Pemex executives.

Then on April 30th, Sheinbaum said she expects an agreement between Pemex and Petrobras to materialize, following the Brazilian president’s partnership proposal earlier this year.

In my view, these two developments raise the probability that Braskem Idesa’s creditors, along with billionaire Slim, will help engineer a debt refinancing that keeps Chapter 11 off the table.

The spread recovery the market is ignoring

On top of that, HDPE prices in Brazil and South America have been fluctuating between $1,750 and $1,950 per ton. Meanwhile, ethylene out of Texas, which is Braskem Idesa’s supply source, is running around $750 per ton.

That puts the HDPE spread at a minimum of $1,000 per ton in Q1, compared to $625 per ton in Q4.

Tracking the ships: what vessel data reveals about Q1 demand

Then I had an idea.

I decided to track the locations of two Braskem Idesa vessels: Brilliant Future and Brave Future, using Maritime Optima data.

Starting with Brilliant Future, IMO 9987615. The vessel has been running frequent voyages. Its most recent trip was from Houston to the state of Bahia, where Braskem operates the Camaçari petrochemical complex, which runs on ethane as its primary feedstock.

But the second vessel is where it gets interesting.

Brave Future, IMO 9987627, was not making the Houston to Brazil or Mexico run. It was heading to China in mid-April.

After Brave Future offloaded in China on April 22nd, it is now heading back to Texas. I think there is a strong probability it turns around and makes another run to the same Chinese customers, who are facing a sharp supply shortage driven by the war.

If that second voyage materializes, this stops being a one-off arbitrage and starts looking like a trade route being built in real time, ethane-based polyethylene from the U.S. Gulf Coast stepping into the void left by Asian suppliers effectively locked out of the Mexican and broader Latin American market.

We won’t have Q1 volume data until Braskem reports. But the vessel activity suggests the demand signal was strong enough to send the ship back for more. That’s not something you see in a soft market.

3. Takeaway

Braskem is priced like the worst case has already happened. The data says otherwise.

Naphtha at post-COVID highs. Braskem Idesa spreads recovering. Bonds stopped falling. Ships heading to China, not in ballast.

I’m not expecting a perfect setup. The debt load is real, and I’m not pretending it isn’t. But the market is pricing the risk, not the opportunity.

That’s where asymmetric trades live.

This is only Part 1. In the second part, I’ll walk through the remaining reasons behind my decision to add, despite the risks.

Publishing mid-week.

Disclaimer

The information provided in this publication is for informational and educational purposes only and should not be construed as financial, investment, legal, or tax advice. The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the author and are based on publicly available information believed to be reliable, but their accuracy and completeness cannot be guaranteed.

Nothing in this publication constitutes a recommendation, solicitation, or offer to buy or sell any securities, commodities, or financial instruments. Readers should conduct their own independent research and consult with a qualified financial advisor before making any investment decisions.

The author may hold positions in companies or assets mentioned in this publication and may change these positions at any time without notice. Past performance and historical trends are not reliable indicators of future results.

By reading this publication, you agree that the author and ALLKA Research shall not be held liable for any direct or indirect losses resulting from the use of the information contained herein.

Fresh data from BusinessAnalytIQ’s regional price indices show Latin America (LATAM) polyethylene and polypropylene prices have climbed all the way back to their 2021 pandemic peaks — the highest levels recorded during the COVID-19 supply shock.

Both PE and PP in LATAM are once again trading at those historic tops, reflecting tight regional availability and strong downstream demand recovery.

The standout move, however, is in Europe’s polyethylene market.

After trading in the $1.4–1.6/kg range through most of 2024, European PE has nearly doubled relative to typical COVID-era pricing levels, surging above $2.65/kg in the latest actual data before the outlook begins to ease.

Source: Business Analytiq

That is one of the sharpest regional spikes seen in the entire 2015–2027 series and leaves Europe trading at a substantial premium to the U.S., China/NEA, and Southeast Asia.

Polypropylene shows parallel tension.

Europe again leads the upside with a pronounced 2025 spike, while LATAM has matched its own 2021 highs. Most other regions — including the U.S., India, and Africa — remain well below those pandemic-era ceilings, underscoring a highly fragmented global market.

Business Analytiq

Forward curves in both charts point to gradual moderation through 2026–2027, yet the near-term surge highlights lingering vulnerabilities: energy costs in Europe, logistical bottlenecks, and shifting trade flows are once again dictating price action.

Bottom line: the plastics complex is flashing the same regional divergences that defined the 2020–2021 volatility.

For producers, converters, and commodity traders, the message is unmistakable — LATAM is back at COVID highs, Europe’s PE is pricing in a new stress premium, and the outlook remains anything but smooth.

The first image (Google Maps) highlights the location of key petrochemical assets, including steam crackers and downstream production units concentrated within the cluster.

Source: Google Maps

The second image, based on NASA’s FIRMS fire detection system, shows multiple active heat signatures. These are not scattered anomalies — they align directly with core production areas identified in the first image, indicating that primary processing infrastructure has been affected.

Source: NASA

The impacted zone includes assets operated by Petrokemya, a wholly owned affiliate of SABIC. The site has an installed capacity of approximately 5.15 million tonnes per year, covering olefins, polyethylene, polystyrene, and PVC/VCM.

Market reaction has been immediate. Prices for Saudi polyethylene have already moved above $2,000 per ton, reflecting expectations of supply disruption from one of the world’s most critical export hubs.

Source: Polymerupdate

Al Jubail plays a central role in global petrochemical flows, particularly into Asia and Europe. Any sustained outage at this scale would materially tighten supply across multiple polymer chains.

At first glance, these periods appear fundamentally different. In reality, they are variations of the same mechanism:

naphtha drives costs, polymers follow with a lag, and spreads determine everything.

Today, however, both management commentary and Braskem stock suggest a level of pessimism that appears disconnected from observable polymer prices—particularly when compared to 2022.

Part 1. The COVID Shock: When Deleveraging Was Not What It Seemed

The onset of the COVID-19 created a highly asymmetric shock across the petrochemical value chain, and Braskem was a clear beneficiary—at least at the EBITDA level.

However, a closer look at 2020 suggests that the company’s rapid deleveraging was driven less by structural balance sheet improvement and more by a temporary dislocation between feedstock costs, product pricing, and working capital dynamics.

In Q1 2020, naphtha prices hovered around $414/ton, reflecting the lagged impact of collapsing oil demand.

By Q2 2020, prices had fallen sharply to approximately $236/ton, implying a ~43% sequential decline.

In the 3rd quarter its price rose to $377/ton as I indicated in the chart below.

Source: graph was made by Author based on the financial reports of Braskem [Brazil]

At the same time, downstream polymer prices remained relatively stable.

I must note that from now on and in this part of the article, I will only discuss the second and third quarters of 2020.

• Polypropylene Asia: ~$806 → $899

• Polyethylene U.S.: ~$703 → $904

• Polyvinyl Asia: ~$693 → $813

Source: graph was made by Author based on the financial reports of Braskem [Brazil]

This divergence led to a rapid expansion in spreads, particularly in polyethylene, which translated almost mechanically into higher profitability.

Source: graph was made by Author based on the financial reports of Braskem [Brazil]

The impact on earnings was immediate. EBITDA in Brazil increased from $219 million in 2Q20 to $529 million in 3Q20 (+148% QoQ), while the United States and Europe segment rose from $45 million to $133 million (+223% QoQ).

Source: Braskem

The recovery was supported by both improved margins and a normalization in operating rates, with Brazilian utilization reaching 87% (+17 p.p. QoQ).

At the headline level, this translated into rapid deleveraging. Net debt remained broadly stable, but the surge in EBITDA drove net debt-to-EBITDA from above 7x to below 5x within a single quarter, creating the impression of a structurally improving balance sheet.

Source: Braskem

Management Commentary

Despite this apparent improvement, a critical offsetting force was developing beneath the surface—one tied directly to feedstock sourcing.

Historically, Braskem relied heavily on imported naphtha, not only for cost optimization but also for financing flexibility. International suppliers typically offered extended payment terms, allowing the company to delay cash outflows and support working capital. In 2020, this model shifted following a commercial agreement with Petrobras.

As a result, Braskem increased domestic purchases to approximately two-thirds of total naphtha consumption. While the agreement included a meaningful discount of $15–35 per ton, it fundamentally altered cash flow dynamics.

When we import, we are able to have extended payment terms from our suppliers. So we have in working capital a good volume coming from this imported naphtha purchase.

And a lot of that naphtha is being paid or was paid in the 1H of this year. Now this year, it is a reverse. We are buying roughly 2/3 of our naphtha from Petrobras.

And because of that with Petrobras, we do not have the extended payment terms. So in the end, looking at cash flow, we are paying naphtha from last year and we are also paying naphtha for this year from the purchases from Petrobras.

The timing of this transition amplified its impact. During the first half of 2020, the company was simultaneously settling deferred payments related to imported naphtha while also paying for current Petrobras volumes on a much shorter cycle. This created a double cash outflow, which offset much of the EBITDA-driven improvement.

That is why you will see the draw on cash from working capital. Moving forward, and looking at the 2H20, we will continue prioritizing the purchases of naphtha according to market dynamics.

Because the naphtha price is holding up in the 2H20, I would think that the usual situation is that we would increase import a little bit.”

Interim conclusion

The key takeaway is not the strength of the recovery itself, but its composition. Braskem’s deleveraging during this period was driven primarily by a denominator effect—EBITDA expansion—rather than a fundamental improvement in cash generation.

This created a temporary disconnect between profitability and liquidity, where margins improved sharply but cash flow lagged due to adverse working capital dynamics.

Part 2. 2022: Geopolitics, Cost Inflation, and the Limits of Resilience

The first quarter of 2022 marked a turning point for the petrochemical cycle. While headline polymer prices remained elevated—at levels comparable to those seen in late 2025 in China—the underlying economics for Braskem deteriorated materially.

Source: graph was made by Author based on the financial reports of Braskem [Brazil]

The key difference from 2020 was not pricing, but cost pressure.

Naphtha prices surged to approximately $884/ton in 1Q22, more than 3x from the trough levels observed in 2Q20. At the same time, polymer prices remained relatively strong:

• Polypropylene Asia: ~$806 → $899

• Polyethylene U.S.: ~$703 → $904

• Polyvinyl Asia: ~$693 → $813

Source: graph was made by Author based on the financial reports of Braskem [Brazil]

At first glance, this pricing environment appeared supportive. However, unlike the COVID dislocation—where falling feedstock costs expanded margins—2022 was defined by input cost inflation outpacing downstream pricing, resulting in a sharp compression of spreads.

This shift was directly reflected in financial performance. Braskem reported Recurring EBITDA of $920 million in 1Q22, down 19% sequentially and 27% year-over-year, despite still-elevated polymer prices. The decline was primarily driven by the normalization—and in many cases compression—of spreads across key products and regions.

Source: Braskem

Spread Compression Across the Portfolio

The deterioration was broad-based and structurally different from the demand-driven weakness seen in 2020:

• PE spreads in Brazil declined 28% QoQ, as rising naphtha prices offset stable demand

• PP spreads contracted 26% QoQ, reflecting higher feedstock costs and weaker Asian demand

• PVC spreads fell 21% QoQ, driven by lower prices and rising input costs

In the U.S. and Europe, the pattern was similar. Even where demand remained relatively healthy, margin pressure emerged due to cost inflation and normalization of supply conditions following earlier disruptions such as Winter Storm Uri.

Management Commentary (1Q22 Call)

“The beginning of 2022 was marked by geopolitical tensions, which brought a lot of volatility to the petrochemical scenario.”

“the expectation of external consultants for the PE naphtha spreads for 2022 is already at a level above the pre-war Russia and Ukraine.”

“for the remaining quarters of this year, PE naphtha spreads are expected to remain at healthy levels and above the recent historical average”

Despite this relatively constructive forward-looking tone, the actual quarterly data suggests that “healthy” spreads were already under pressure in real time, particularly when compared to the extraordinary levels seen in 2021.

Interim conclusion

If 2020 demonstrated how quickly EBITDA can expand when feedstock costs collapse, 2022 showed the opposite: how rapidly profitability can erode when costs rise faster than prices.

Braskem entered 2022 with a more diversified and theoretically resilient operating model. However, the quarter made clear that diversification can mitigate—but not eliminate—exposure to global commodity cycles.

The key distinction relative to 2020 is critical:

• 2020: Falling costs → expanding spreads → EBITDA-driven deleveraging

• 2022: Rising costs → compressing spreads → EBITDA contraction despite high prices

This shift underscores a recurring theme in Braskem’s financial profile:
headline pricing is a poor proxy for profitability.

Part 3. 2026: Geopolitics, Structural Pressure, and a Mispriced Cycle

The first quarter of 2026 once again places Braskem at the intersection of geopolitics and petrochemical cycles. However, unlike both 2020 and 2022, the current environment combines elements of both phases—rising feedstock costs and tightening supply—while the equity market reflects a far more pessimistic view.

Naphtha prices averaged around $760/ton in 1Q26, rising to approximately $850+/ton by the end of March, driven by escalating tensions in the Middle East.

Source: TRADING ECONOMICS

At the same time, polymer prices in China [largest chemicals manufacturer in the world] have been moving higher, albeit with a lag:

• Polypropylene (PP): ~8,100 → 9,184 CNY/t ($1,157 → $1,312)

• Polyethylene (PE): ~8,000 → 8,693 CNY/t ($1,142 → $1,241)

TRADING ECONOMICS

This lagged transmission mechanism—where feedstock costs adjust first and polymer prices follow—remains a defining feature of the petrochemical cycle. In the short term, it compresses margins; only later does pricing catch up, partially restoring spreads.

Geopolitical Shock: Supply Risk, Not Demand Collapse

The current volatility is being driven not by demand destruction, but by supply-side risks linked to the Middle East.

Management Commentary (4Q25 Call)

“we have observed an escalation of tensions in the Middle East involving the United States Israel and Iran… reflected in greater volatility in commodity prices, especially Brent crude oil and naphtha”

“Naphtha has followed this volatility given its direct link to oil, which can impact the costs of the petrochemical chain”

“lower availability of feedstock imported from the Middle East… could lead to shutdowns and production reductions”

“a scenario of lower global supply could lead to an increase in operating rates to meet the shortage of resins”

A key risk factor remains the potential disruption of the Strait of Hormuz, which is critical for global petrochemical flows. Management estimates that a severe restriction scenario could reduce global polyethylene supply by 6–19 million tons (4–11%) and polypropylene by 7–10 million tons (4–5%).

This introduces a dynamic not seen in 2020 or 2022:
simultaneous cost inflation and potential supply tightening, which could eventually support prices—but only after an initial margin squeeze.

Industry Backdrop: Weak Utilization, Fragile Demand

Despite rising prices, the industry enters this phase from a position of structural weakness.

Cycle Pressure (Key Quote)

“the prolonged petrochemical downcycle has resulted in lowest industry operating rates in decades… 79% for polyethylene and 74% for polypropylene”

Global demand for polyethylene and polypropylene declined by approximately 3 million tons, reflecting weaker consumption across key regions. This means that, unlike 2020, higher prices are not being driven by strong demand, but rather by cost push and supply constraints.

Feedstock Strategy: Reduced Risk, Not Eliminated Exposure

One of the most important structural changes since 2020 is Braskem’s gradual reduction in naphtha dependency.

Strategic Direction (Key Quotes)

“today, we are 80% naphtha-based… and our plan is, by 2030, to reach 60% naphtha and 40% ethanol and gas”

“we’re also importing ethane from the U.S… as a way of sidestepping the increasing cost of feedstocks”

This diversification is already visible across regions:

• Brazil: partial shift toward ethane and propane

• U.S.: structurally advantaged gas-based operations

• Mexico (Braskem Idesa):

  • predominantly ethane-based

  • minimal direct exposure to naphtha

Operational data confirms this shift. In 4Q25, Braskem Idesa increased ethane supply to ~29.4 kb/d (imports), alongside 15.9 kb/d from Pemex and additional Fast Track volumes. This supported higher utilization rates and reinforces the structural advantage of gas-based production.

Sourcing Advantage: Relative, Not Absolute

Unlike Asian competitors, Braskem’s feedstock supply is not structurally constrained.

Sourcing Commentary

“our main supplier of naphtha is the U.S… the U.S. has a surplus of naphtha supply”

“with regard to our naphtha supply… it is not impacted by any of these conflicts”

“of course, there is an impact in higher prices”

This creates a relative advantage versus Asian producers dependent on Middle Eastern supply, some of whom are already reducing operating rates. However, the benefit is price-based rather than cost-based—Braskem still pays higher global prices, even if supply is secure.

Pricing Actions: Cost Pass-Through Under Constraints

Recent commercial actions highlight the current environment. In Brazil, Braskem implemented a R$6,500/ton increase in polyethylene prices, combined with strict volume caps (initially ~35% of demand).

Valuation Disconnect: 2022 vs 2026

Perhaps the most striking feature of the current setup is the divergence between fundamentals and equity pricing.

• 1Q22:

  • Polymer prices: ~$1,350–1,380/t

  • Naphtha: ~$950/t

  • Stock: ~$18

• 1Q26:

  • Polymer prices: ~$1,200–1,350/t (now rising above 2022 levels)

  • Naphtha: ~$760–850/t

  • Stock: ~$3.5

Despite a broadly similar pricing environment—and in some cases higher polymer prices—the stock trades at a fraction of its 2022 level.

Conclusion: A Cycle Misread

Across all three periods, one principle holds:

Today, the market appears to be extrapolating short-term cost pressure while ignoring:

• stabilization in naphtha (~$820–850)

• continued recovery in polymer prices

• lagged margin expansion potential

• structural diversification away from naphtha

At the same time, management commentary remains heavily focused on downside risks—geopolitics, logistics, and volatility—despite a setup that is fundamentally less severe than 2022.

The result is a rare alignment:

• cycle improving (with lag)

• management cautious

• equity deeply discounted

In this context, Braskem is not simply a leveraged petrochemical company under pressure.

It is a case where:

Disclaimer

The information provided in this publication is for informational and educational purposes only and should not be construed as financial, investment, legal, or tax advice. The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the author and are based on publicly available information believed to be reliable, but their accuracy and completeness cannot be guaranteed.

Nothing in this publication constitutes a recommendation, solicitation, or offer to buy or sell any securities, commodities, or financial instruments. Readers should conduct their own independent research and consult with a qualified financial advisor before making any investment decisions.

The author may hold positions in companies or assets mentioned in this publication and may change these positions at any time without notice. Past performance and historical trends are not reliable indicators of future results.

By reading this publication, you agree that the author and ALLKA Research shall not be held liable for any direct or indirect losses resulting from the use of the information contained herein.